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INTRODUCTION
Contract law is full of unacknowledged contradictions that have real life consequences. It purports, for example, to provide neutral and objective rules to govern every aspect of a contract, from its making 1 to its performance, 2 to its remedies in the event of breach. 3 But instead of living up to its promise of providing neutral rules, contract law continues to privilege and protect unequal bargaining power, which in turn reinforces societal inequities and privileges rather than reduces the coercion that exists in every contract. 4 In a world of dramatically expanding inequality, 5 it seems more than appropriate to examine contract law's role in this reproduction of inequality.
Last century's attempt at a paradigm shift in contract formation is embedded in one strand of Legal Realism scholarship-a strand most often identified with Karl Llewellyn and Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 6 That strand of legal realism, commonly referred to as the reformist or law-in-action strand, sought to decouple contract law from its formalistic roots and bring it back in touch with reality. 7 But in so doing, the law-in-action strand of Legal Realism ended up working at cross purposes with the other, critical strand of Realism. As a practical consequence, Llewellyn's paradigm shift in contract law only served to intensify the structural problems built into the contract law system. This Essay takes a preliminary stab at explaining why Llewellyn's efforts to reform contract law have had such serious long-term but unintended consequences for the modern contract law system. It does so in an unorthodox way. Instead of drawing from traditional contract-law scholarship, the Essay imports insights from two fields that at first blush seem distant: civil rights law and social philosophy. The Essay's central thesis is that tweaking existing doctrine will never meaningfully change the modern contract law system. In fact, doctri-nal reform will almost always be counterproductive, as reforms from within will only rebuild power, advancing and further protecting the interests of the privileged. Understanding and revealing this trap is essential to finding a path to meaningful, lasting change.
The Essay has three parts. Part I sets the stage by summarizing the contributions made by the Legal Realists and, in particular, Karl Llewellyn. Part II then explores how Llewellyn's project within Legal Realism has worked at cross-purposes to the goals of other Legal Realists. Specifically, by pursuing law in action, Llewellyn ultimately, although unintentionally, increased the power embedded in contract law and exacerbated, rather than reduced, inequities. Drawing from leading scholarship in other fields, Part III reveals why the law-in-action strand of Legal Realism was destined to fail and continues to fail. The Essay concludes with some tentative thoughts on how to move forward.
A key point to underscore before continuing is that this Essay's aim is not to provide a comprehensive recipe for contract law reform. Such an ambitious project is beyond the scope of an essay. But while perhaps less ambitious, the Essay's bottom line is equally important. It reveals an intrinsic failing in the dominant approaches to contract law reform and seeks to spur scholarly discussion on how to more meaningfully dismantle current inequities entrenched in the law. Contrary to traditional contract law critiques, this Essay concludes that meaningful reform will only occur by understanding power-who has it, why they have it, and how they keep it.
I. LEGAL REALISM AND KARL LLEWELLYN
The story of Legal Realism of the 1920s and 1930s 8 is still debated 9 and full of contradictions, both internal 10 and external. 11 This Essay does not attempt to resolve these contradictions or to engage in the substantive debate surrounding Legal Realism. That said, there seems to be no disagreement that Karl Llewellyn was a Legal Realist. 12 Consequently, a brief history of Legal 21 See supra note 11 and accompanying text (noting internal contradictions). 22 HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 209; cf., SCHLEGEL, supra note 9, at 7-8. 23 DUXBURY, supra note 11, at 3 (explaining legal formalism, which conceived of law "as a small body of formally interrelated fundamental doctrinal principles"); id. at 10-32; KAL-MAN, supra note 11, at 3-4 (Realists challenged the conceptualism of Classical Legal Thought, which was an attempt to "reduce law to a set of rules and principles" that "guided judges to their decision. 27 and contract rights, 28 the Realists were able to expose the omnipresence of the state in the creation and distribution of rights and wealth in society. 29 In so doing, the Realists sought to debunk the claim of the older legal orthodoxy that law was neutral, natural, and apolitical, 30 and expose the politically conservative, status-quo-oriented nature of classical legal thought. 31 The critical strand of Legal Realism, therefore, was at least in part a critique of power 32 -power that was embedded but concealed in law, in the ostensibly free market, and in society in general.
The reformist strand of Legal Realism set out to determine the "law in action;" 33 that is, to figure out the way the law actually worked in society in 25 terms of its impact on individuals and institutions. 34 To bring the law back in touch with reality, the Realists believed that the law needed to correctly mirror social relations. 35 To accomplish this task, the Realists adopted naturalism, 36 a methodology that required legal theorizing to be firmly situated and in line with the empirical approach in the natural sciences. 37 In conformity with this approach, 38 the Realists set out to develop and collect a series of social science studies that would accurately describe social reality. 39 Laws and institutions could then be crafted that would better reflect and be better prepared to deal with a more complex social reality. 40 This undertaking was specifically nonnormative in nature. 41 The "Is," in other words, was consciously separated from the "Ought." 42 The purpose of legal theory, therefore, was merely to identify and describe, not justify, the social reality that was uncovered. figure) , with HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 171 (calling it ironic that Llewellyn came to be known as the "undisputed guru of Realism," given Llewellyn's inexperience and lack of jurisprudential work at the time he "defined" Legal Realism);
historiography, it seems undisputable that Llewellyn pursued the law in action or reformist strand of Legal Realism. 45 Nowhere is this better reflected than in Llewellyn's own writings. 46 A couple of examples will have to suffice to establish this point. In the conclusion to A Realistic Jurisprudence, for instance, Llewellyn argued that the "focus of study . . . for all things legal has been shifting," such that a "clearer visualization of the problems involved moves toward ever-decreasing emphasis on words, and ever-increasing emphasis on observable behavior." 47 Then, in Some Realism About Realism, Llewellyn remonstrated that, "no judgment of what Ought to be done in the future with respect to any part of law can be intelligently made without knowing objectively, as far as possible, what that part of law is now doing."
48 Tellingly, Llewellyn went on to state that, "'[l]aw' without effect approaches zero in its meaning. To be ignorant of its effect is to be ignorant of its meaning. To know its effect without study of the persons whom it affects is impossible."
49
To situate Karl Llewellyn within Legal Realism, therefore, seems relatively straightforward. To pin down Llewellyn's contribution(s) to American jurisprudence in general or to Legal Realism in particular, however, is beyond the scope of this Essay. Others are much more qualified to undertake that task. 50 It is sufficient for the purposes of this Essay to note that the Uniform Commercial Code has been called "the flower of the legal realist movement in SCHLEGEL, supra note 9, at 6 (Llewellyn was on the margins of Legal Realism), and Tamanaha, supra note 11, at 736. 45 49 Id. at 1249; see also Llewellyn, Contract, supra note 46, at 705 (posing and attempting to answer the broad question of "the role of contract in the social order, the part that contract plays in the life of men"); Llewellyn, Natural Law, supra note 46, at 6 ("Guidance for a particular society must plant its feet in that society. And guidance for a positive legal scheme must rub elbows with that scheme, or grow chimerical."). In Llewellyn, Offer, supra note 46, Llewellyn's main argument is that the dichotomy drawn between bilateral and unilateral contracts under traditional (or orthodox) contract law was completely meaningless when factually tested in the context of business bargains. 53 Notwithstanding his contribution to the UCC project as a whole, Llewellyn is probably most well-known for drafting Article 2 (covering the sale of goods). 54 Llewellyn's pursuit of the law in action is stamped all over this part of the Code. 55 Unfortunately, in pursuing the law in action, Llewellyn ultimately worked at cross-purposes with the critical strand of Legal Realism, and this produced (and continues to produce) serious but unintended consequences.
II. CROSS PURPOSES AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
Karl Llewellyn was extremely critical of the orthodox conception of contract law that was premised on what he considered an archaic formation structure consisting of offer, acceptance, and consideration. 56 To Llewellyn, this model was unrealistic because it did not actually function well and did not comport with reality. 57 He therefore attempted a paradigm shift away from the idea of a promise as the basis of contractual obligation in favor of the parties' agreement in fact. 58 He did so in a specific attempt to substitute a more dynamic agreement construct, one that was transaction-oriented, for the old, 51 Mooney, supra 49, at 254; see also static model of formation premised on offer, acceptance, and consideration. 59 To Llewellyn, his new construct represented the law in action-it was functional and represented the way businesses actually conducted business. 60 And by "business," Llewellyn meant "merchants." Llewellyn, in other words, drafted Article 2 to reflect mercantile customs and practices. 61 Under Llewellyn's agreement-in-fact construct, therefore, formation of a contract was (and is) made much easier.
62 For example, under Article 2, contracts can be formed by conduct 63 and not just through an exchange of communications that constitute an offer followed by an acceptance. 64 In addition, a contract can be formed even though the exact moment of mutual assent cannot be identified, 65 and even if material terms are missing, 66 provided that the parties intended to make a contract and an appropriate remedy can be crafted. 67 The Code's rules regarding acceptance are also relaxed, thus making it easier to conclude that acceptance occurred, 68 and, hence, a contract was formed. 69 As for consideration, it is not even required for a valid contract in certain instances.
70
At the same time, Llewellyn also introduced two concepts that were new to contract law: good faith 71 incorporated norms of fairness and cooperation into contract law 73 and ostensibly worked to benefit the weaker contracting party by circumscribing the types of terms that would theoretically get enforced 74 and the behavior of the contracting partners in the performance and enforcement of their contract.
75
Where
77
According to the "critical" Realists, 78 coercion is ubiquitous in contracting. In fact, coercion is "at the heart of every bargain."
79 This is because every party is entitled by law to withhold from his contracting partner everything that he owns, whether it be his land, labor, capital, money, etc.
80 "Coercion, therefore, is a function of ownership."
81 Ownership, in turn, is determined by the state, because ownership is very much "a function of legal entitlements[;] it was and is the state that creates and protects property rights."
82 It follows that the more one party owns, the stronger that party's threat to withhold what he owns becomes. 83 Coercion therefore exists every time a party decides to enter into a contract "to avoid the consequences with which the other [party] threatens him."
84 Thus, because every contract involves mutual threats to withhold-for example, where one party says "pay me what I am asking, or I will withhold my goods" and the other party responds "give me your goods, or I will withhold my money,"-every contract is the product of state-sponsored coercion.
85
In the context of contract formation, the amount a party owns determines that party's bargaining power or capacity to coerce. 86 The more coercive capac- ity/bargaining power a party has the more that party gets to dictate the terms of the contract. A party's coercive capacity does not in and of itself pose a problem. But this capacity is coupled with two structural features of the modern contract law system that make it extremely difficult for the weaker party to effectively challenge whether a contract was formed at all. First, regardless of ideology, all the competing tests for mutual assent (i.e., the doctrine by which the individual agreement of the parties is tested) make it very easy to establish mutual assent in practice; 87 and, as a general rule, consideration is usually present in market-based transactions. 88 Second, a presumption of contract validity springs into existence at the moment a contract is formed via mutual assent and consideration. 89 This presumption of contract validity is extremely difficult to rebut in practice because of what I have referred to elsewhere as the "process problem" in contract law. 90 To begin with, the process problem imposes the burden on the party challenging the contract or defending a breach of contract action to show that the contract is unenforceable. 91 Moreover, all the other contract doctrines one might use to either challenge or defend against the contract (including but not limited to contract interpretation and defenses to performance) presume that a valid contract has already been formed. 92 In addition, several practical realities exist, such as the costs of litigation, the ubiquity of certain contract boilerplate clauses (i.e., merger, arbitration, choice of law, choice of forum clauses), and the fact that courts are reluctant to allow parties out of their contracts, regardless of the legal excuse raised. 93 All of this together means that a successful rebuttal of the presumption of contract validity is highly unlikely in practice. 94 Thus, as a direct result of the presumption of contract validity, a contract formed via Article 2's formation rules will usually be binding and all of its terms, including any unreasonable ones, will most likely be enforceable in court. 95 Significantly, the difficulty of disproving the presumption of contract validity may well give license, if not perverse incentive, to the party with greater coercive capacity to impose more onerous terms during contract formation. 96 95 Hart, Formation, supra note 62, at 215; Hart, Reality, supra note 4, at 13. 96 Hart, Formation, supra note 62, at 216; Hart, Reality, supra note 4, at 57. 97 Regardless of whether the incentive to impose more onerous terms is capitalized on or not, the party with more coercive capacity/bargaining power will get to dictate the terms of the contract. Coercive capacity/bargaining power will be increased with each contract the stronger party enters into because the stronger party is able to reap more from each contract the coercive capacity of the stronger contracting party. 98 This is because the stronger party will not only be able to reap more gains (in terms of money, land, capital, etc.) through each contract it enters into, but the presumption of contract validity will also enable that party to retain those gains. 99 Recall that the amount one owns determines one's bargaining power/coercive capacity. It thus becomes a vicious circle: the more a party owns, the more bargaining power/coercive capacity that party has; the more that party gets to dictate contract terms, the more property that party gets to acquire; and so on. 100 In the end, the coercion present in contract law is increased and entrenched. More than that, the coercion that exists is concealed, because satisfying Article 2's formation rules provides a veneer of voluntariness. 101 A contract is by common understanding an act of free will (autonomy); after all, one must "agree" to be bound. 102 Hence, there is (usually) no coercion in contracting. 103 Or so the argument goes.
In short, by pursuing the law in action in Article 2, specifically, by making it easier to form a contract, Llewellyn ended up increasing, further entrenching, and concealing the coercion present in contract law. In so doing, he worked at cross-purposes with and arguably even undermined the other critical strand of Legal Realism that exposed and critiqued power. 104 This result is not surprising and, in fact, is to be expected.
III. THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION

A. "Preservation Through Transformation"
By changing contract law's formation rules, Llewellyn ended up increasing the coercion present in contract law. This result is to be expected because this is what the law does. That is, regardless of any attempts to bring about change, the law tends to evolve in such a way as to preserve and privilege than it otherwise could with less coercive capacity/bargaining power. See Hart, Reality, supra note 4, at 52. 98 106 Reva Siegel documents the evolution of the law governing marital violence (or wife beating) from the days when husbands possessed a "chastisement prerogative," to the enactment of the Violence Against Women Act. 107 Notwithstanding consistent efforts to reform the law to better protect women, 108 violence against women within their own households continues to persist in staggering numbers. 109 In "Whiteness As Property," 110 Cheryl Harris traces the transformation of the concept of "whiteness" from a description of skin color used merely as a way to distinguish white indentured or bond servants from captured Africans who were sold in the Americas, 111 to a property right with legal and social value and consequences. 112 It is not possible to do justice to either of these articles in the short space that this Essay will devote to them. But collectively, both articles tell a very similar story, and it is this collective story that has resonances for contract law. That story goes like this:
Despite periodic success, the law governing marital violence and race evolved in such a way as to reflect and perpetuate racial, gender, and class hierarchies such that heterosexual white men, usually but not necessarily limited to the middle and upper classes, were privileged and their interests protected by law. For example, by the 1870s, a husband's prerogative to physically chastise his wife 113 was unequivocally repudiated by the courts. 114 Violence in marriage, however, continued to exist. 115 The law's response to the ongoing violence was hostile to any remedy "that might assist wives in separating from their husbands" 116 because nineteenth-century judges assumed "that a wife was obliged to endure various kinds of violence as a normal-and sometimes deserved-part of married life." 117 These same judges also assumed that a certain amount of violence was an accepted fact of life for the married poor.
118
Some marital violence was subject to criminal prosecution, 119 but those prosecutions were usually limited to African-American men 120 and members of the "vicious [and dangerous] classes," 121 i.e., the poor, who beat their wives.
122
Middle and upper class white men were rarely if ever prosecuted, and, in fact, were granted various legal immunities, both criminal and civil, 123 for wife beating in the name of "affective privacy." 124 This privileging of heterosexual white men translated into the unequal distribution of social and material benefits and goods. 125 Ownership of property, for example, was originally limited to white men. 126 In addition to social standing, 127 public reputation, 128 and the "'public and psychological wage'" of being white, 129 white identity also "conferred tangible and economically valuable benefits" 130 because property was and is broadly construed to include "all of those human rights, liberties, powers, and immunities that are important for 116 Id. at 2132. 117 Id. at 2133-34. 118 Id. at 2134. 119 Several states adopted public flogging as the punishment for wife beating. Id. at 2137. 120 Id. at 2136, 2138-40. 121 Id. at 2138-39 (internal quotation marks omitted). 122 See id. 123 Id. at 2154-61 (discussing criminal immunity), 2161-70 (discussing inter-spousal tort immunity). 124 "Affective privacy" is the rhetoric that replaced authority-based conceptions of marriage, which had been used to justify giving husbands the prerogative to physically chastise their wives. Id. at 2151-53. Affective privacy embodied the ideas of companionate marriage, (i.e., the belief that wives were companions to their husbands and not their servants, and therefore, ties of affection and "disinterested love," not authority, linked household members), and marital privacy (i.e., the belief that to protect the sanctity of marriage, what happens between a husband and wife should be shielded from public scrutiny). Id. at 2143-44, 2147, 2151-53. 125 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 110, at 1741. 126 See id. at 1715-24 (discussing the racialized nature of property in general), 1718 (noting that Blacks were not permitted to own property), 1718-21 (discussing fusion of race economic domination through slavery), 1721-24 (showing only white claims to property ownership were recognized via conquest); see also Siegel, supra note 106, at 2122 (discussing how a husband acquired rights to most of his wife's property upon marriage). 127 Harris, supra note 110, at 1737. 128 Id. at 1734-36, 1746-50 (discussing Homer A. Plessy's reputation claim in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)). 129 Id. at 1741 (quoting W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION 700 (1976)). These wages that were accorded to white identity included public deference, being " 'admitted freely with all classes of white people, to public functions . . . . The police were drawn from their ranks . . . . Their vote selected public officials [which] . . . had great effect on their personal treatment.' " Id. at 1741-42 (quoting W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION 700-01 (1976)). 130 Id. at 1726; see also Siegel, supra note 106, at 2154-61, 2161-70 (discussing criminal immunity and inter-spousal tort immunity for wife beating).
human well-being, including: freedom of expression, . . . and free and equal opportunity to use personal faculties." 131 But more than this, heterosexual white male privilege (material and social), together with its status on top of the hierarchy, were normalized such that the category and its privileges became the baseline, the quintessential objective, neutral, apolitical, and unquestioned norm. 132 A mechanism was then used that enabled the legal system to mask, or at least divert attention away from, the hierarchy with its attendant and unequal privileges. For Harris, this mechanism is her ingenious "whiteness" construct, 133 and for Siegel it is the use of ostensibly neutral legal language that reflects neither gender, nor class, nor race. 134 "Whiteness," for example, not only ameliorated class hierarchies but also enabled the class exploitation present in labor markets to be evaded. 135 This is because whiteness enabled white workers to "accept their lower class position in the hierarchy 'by fashioning identities as 'not slaves' and as 'not Blacks.''" 136 What changes from one period to another in the evolution of the law is simply the rhetoric and legal strategies or doctrines used to legitimate the new hierarchical regimes. A husband's right to physically chastise his wife, 137 for instance, was replaced by criminal and tort immunities for wife beating; 138 and the legal rhetoric changed from justifications that were authority-based and explicitly hierarchical 139 to the language of companionate marriage 140 and affective privacy. 141 In each instance, however, the hierarchies (men over women, rich men over poor men, white men over Black men) and a husband's prerogative to physically chastise his wife remained intact. Some might argue that the collective story told by Siegel and Harris is about status law (gender, race, class) and is a public law (civil rights) story to boot, while contract law is private law, does not implicate a status category, and has nothing whatsoever to do with civil rights. But this argument would be wrong. 147 Although it is true that contract law and civil rights are rarely if ever discussed together, contract law does implicate a status category. Specifically, contract law is very much intertwined with class. Viewed from this perspective, the collective story told by Siegel and Harris is also the story of contract law.
Class hierarchy is intimately connected to contract law by virtue of the fact that pre-existing and unequal distributions of property (land, capital, resources, etc.) are taken as a given and never questioned, 148 as if such unequal distributions are natural, apolitical rights that are sorted out by individuals competing in a free market. In reality, property rights are state conferred rights that are literally premised on racial and gender subordination. 149 Recall that property ownership was originally limited to white men. 150 Consequently, the state did not distribute property rights equally from the very beginning.
151 This unequal distribution is thus perpetuated and exacerbated over time because one's property rights determine one's bargaining power in the market, and hence what and how much one will ultimately be able to acquire. 152 And, like the collective story of gender and race hierarchy Siegel and Harris detail, contract law also evolved (and continues to evolve) in such a way as to reflect and maintain class hierarchy. The only things that change during the evolution of contract law are the rhetoric and legal doctrines used to legitimate the hierarchical regime. 145 Harris, supra note 110, at 1757. 146 Id. 147 I have argued elsewhere that contract law is public not private and will not devote any time to this argument in this Essay. See Hart, Reality, supra note 4, at 33-34; see also Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Law in Context (forthcoming) (on file with author) (arguing that contracts and contract law have everything to do with civil rights and equality). 148 See generally Cohen, Property, supra note 27 (exposing the role of the state in creating property rights and the consequences that directly flow from that, namely, the delegation of power by the state to owners to compel fellow human beings to do what the owners want, which ultimately leads to the unequal distribution of material benefits); Hale, Duress, supra note 26, at 603-04 (exposing the unquestioned nature and existence of ownership of property (land, labor, etc.) and its relationship to coercion). 149 See Hart, Reality, supra note 4, at 34-35, 55-57 (discussing the state's role in property rights and contracts); Harris, supra note 110, passim (documenting how whiteness was constructed by the state as a property right). 150 See supra text accompanying notes 112, 126, & 131. 151 Nor are all state-conferred property rights equal-some people are endowed with more advantageous rights than others. See Hale, Duress, supra note 26, at 627-28. 152 See supra text accompanying notes 97, 112, & 131; see also Hale, Duress, supra note 26, at 627-28 ("It is with these unequal rights that men bargain and exert pressure on one another. These rights give birth to the unequal fruits of bargaining."); Hart, Reality, supra note 4, at 33-35, 54.
Contract law rhetoric went from the bucolic images of the nineteenth century's arm's length, face-to-face transaction to trade a horse, 153 for example, to Llewellyn's savvy merchant seller or buyer who was wise to the ways of the twentieth century market. 154 These changes in contract law rhetoric were probably prompted by the dramatic social and economic transformation of American society, including, but certainly not limited to, the increasingly greater concentration of capital among a smaller number of companies vis-à-vis the rights of workers who attempted to organize "in response to their collective dependence on these emerging monopolies . . . , exploitation of the Third World, [and] advancing technology." 155 The classical rules of contract law simply did not reflect the power disparities that were part and parcel of everyday life. 156 Legal doctrine thus shifted from the static offer-acceptance-consideration construct of the nineteenth century 157 to Lewellyn's transaction-oriented agreement-in-fact construct, which was cabined by good faith and unconscionability to help ensure its fairness in operation. 158 This change in formation structure did (and does) produce some positive individual results, but not that often. 159 Because the shift in contract doctrine did not produce a systemic remedy 160 and the pre-existing and unequal distribution of property was not tampered with, let alone questioned by the new formation structure and doctrines, the existing class hierarchy with its attendant privileges and power was and is preserved.
The mechanism used in the contract law context to conceal the class hierarchy that contract law helps to maintain is the "free" market. 161 In the ostensibly "free" market, the baseline from which everyone starts is never discussed but is nevertheless premised on pre-existing and unequal distributions of prop-erty. 162 Despite the fact that people do not start from the same baseline, the assumption is that the free market will be the great equalizer. 163 That is, everyone has the same chance to succeed because all it takes to succeed in a free market is individual merit. 164 And because success is made an entirely individual endeavor under market mythology, so is failure. 165 Consequently, if you have not succeeded in the market, something is wrong with you, not with the market in particular or society in general.
Notwithstanding the realities of the market, including the unequal baselines from which people start, the mystical but cherished belief is that, in the free market, anyone can acquire as much as anyone else and, hence, everyone can be equal. Of course, this belief is not true, given everyone's vastly different starting positions; and it only makes sense "in a society [like ours] that defines individualism as the highest good, and the 'market value' of the individual as the just and true assessment." 166 Nevertheless, and as a result, everyone has a stake in maintaining the ideology of the free market as a way to separate me from you and "us" from "them." In other words, acknowledging that the free market is a myth and that the normalized baseline is anything but equal threatens self-and group-identity, the very personal understanding that I am better than you and "we" are better than "them" because I/we have done better than you/them in the market. To acknowledge that the market is not free and the baseline is not equal would expose the class hierarchy present in American society and also force everyone to confront the very real possibility that, absent the unequal distribution of property, that is, if I/we started from the same place as you/them, I/we might be no better than you/them. Worse still, I/we could be worse off (i.e., lower) than you/them in the hierarchy. 167 Hence, the myth of the free market persists and provides a powerful tool that not only reinforces the classical liberal trope of individual merit but also masks the class hierarchy that exists in society at large and contract law's role in helping to maintain it. 168 Thus, the story of contract law is very similar to the collective story told by Siegel and Harris. The law, including contract law, tends to evolve in ways that end up preserving and privileging established hierarchies, thereby perpetuating existing unequal distributions of material and social goods. Siegel calls this phenomenon "preservation through transformation." 169 Preservation through transformation, therefore, gives concrete form to Audre Lorde's haunting maxim: "the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house." 170 At best, Lorde said, "They may allow us temporarily to beat him at his own game, but they will never enable us to bring about genuine change." 171 And so it is with contract law as well.
B. Some Thoughts on Law, Social Structures, and Agency
That law serves power seems to be a provable phenomenon. In and of itself, this is an important insight, particularly in the context of contract law where such things are not comfortably discussed. But two interesting questions lurk in the background of this preservation through transformation analysis. Specifically, why does this phenomenon happen at all, let alone happen so consistently over time and across disciplines? And what explains Karl Llewellyn's role in all of this, given that his own convictions and commitments suggest that he would not have consciously tried to increase the coercion present in contract law? 172 This essay will sketch out brief answers to these questions. According to French social philosopher Pierre Bourdieu, conflict and competition define social life. 173 At stake in this contest is the power to determine what will be deemed legitimate in the social world, where legitimacy means deciding who and what has value and the amount of that value. 174 Systems of classification are thus produced that not only make up and order the social world, but also constitute and order the people within it. 175 The competition and struggle to define legitimacy take place in social structures called fields. 176 Fields are sites of contestation with boundaries that extend only so far as the capital at stake within each field is given effect.
Capital is broadly defined to mean "all forms of power," 178 and therefore includes any and all resources that "become objects of struggle as valued resources." 179 Typical kinds of capital include: economic (money and property), 180 cultural (which "covers a wide variety of resources, such as verbal facility, general cultural awareness, aesthetic preferences, scientific knowledge, and educational credentials"), 181 social (acquaintances, networks, family), 182 and symbolic ("capital in any of its [other] forms insofar as it is accorded positive recognition, esteem, or honor by relevant actors within the field"). 183 The values and types of capital at stake differ from field to field. 184 Regardless of the field, however, a cardinal principle applicable to every field is that each actor has to buy into that field. Specifically, in order to participate in a given field, each actor tacitly agrees to the rules of the game, 185 including the value given to the capital at stake in that field. This "buy-in" is made possible because each actor who participates in a field shares unquestioned opinions and perceptions about the social world that are mediated by the relatively autonomous fields in which she or he participates. 186 These takenfor-granted assumptions or orthodoxies not only determine what constitutes "natural" practice within a field, 187 they also condition and inform each actor's internalized sense of limits and aspirations. 188 In short, these internalized selfevident and unquestioned but tacitly accepted rules of the game in each field determine to a large extent what can and cannot be done within that field and by whom. Equally as important, and specifically because of these self-evident beliefs, the social world as represented in each field is perceived to be completely natural and not arbitrary. 189 Consequently, actors within the field often perceive it to be in their best interest "to act in ways that end up both lending credence to, and reproducing," the practices within that field.
Furthermore, all action taken by actors within a field is "interested."
191 In capitalist societies, interest is generally associated with material forms of accumulation. 192 The pursuit of economic capital would be the primary example. But according to Bourdieu, "interest" is much more broadly defined to include "all . . . goods, material as [well as] symbolic, without distinction, that present themselves as rare and worthy of being sought after." 193 That said, Bourdieu also takes the position that "practice never ceases to conform to economic calculation, even when it gives every appearance of disinterestedness by departing from the logic of interested calculation . . . and playing for stakes that are non-material and not easily quantified." 194 To say that all action is interested, therefore, means that every action an actor takes within a field is designed to maximize his or her economic and symbolic profit. 195 Significantly, and specifically because "the game" taking place within each field is always competitive, actors strive to maintain or improve their field position. 196 While there are many different types of capital, economic capital is the most efficient and powerful. 197 Consequently, economic capital, particularly in capitalist societies, is the most coveted. 198 But economic capital is not distributed equally, since it is a product of accumulation and inheritance. 199 This unequal distribution of economic capital results in the unequal accumulation of other types of capital, as economic capital can and is easily convertible. 200 For example, economic capital enables an actor to obtain cultural capital in the form of educational credentials. Formal education also results in the establishment of acquaintances and networks, which is social capital. 201 Agents, therefore, do not enter fields with the same kinds or amounts of capital. 202 Because of this unequal accumulation of capital, there are two poles within each field-the dominant and dominated poles. 203 Dominant actors are therefore the actors (i.e., individuals, groups, institutions, entities, corporations) with the most capital of the right type(s) as defined by the field. Conversely, dominated actors are the people and entities with the least amount of the right type of capital. 204 But to reiterate, economic capital is the most powerful and determinant, and as a result, it must be symbolically mediated, 205 meaning it must be disguised. It must be disguised because leaving the reproduction and accumulation of economic capital undisguised "would reveal the arbitrary character of the distribution of power and wealth" in society. 206 Hence, the reproduction of domination in modern capitalist and highly differentiated societies is largely left to symbolism. 207 Critical to Bourdieu's theory of reproduction, therefore, is the idea that interest (discussed above) is often misrecognized; 208 that is, none of the actors in the field recognize it as an action designed to maximize profit. 209 This suggests that even though action is always interested, the actor undertaking the action may not be consciously aware that his action is interested. 210 For example, a person may want to become a scientist for the seemingly altruistic purpose of finding a cure for AIDS. Becoming a scientist requires certain educational credentials. Obtaining the educational credentials enables the actor to accumulate social capital (i.e., networks formed with classmates and colleagues in various post-doctoral positions). And given that scientists are held in high esteem in society, the actor also accumulates symbolic capital. 211 All of this symbolic profit (social and symbolic capital, together with any economic capital associated with being a scientist) would result, even unknowingly, in either a more secure or an improved field position (depending on the actor's original field position) for the newly minted scientist, his altruistic desire to cure AIDS notwithstanding.
Significantly and as a result of misrecognition, the actor whose interested action is misrecognized is able to accumulate symbolic capital, 212 which to Bourdieu "is perhaps the most valuable form of accumulation in society." 213 capital-namely, cultural and symbolic (in the form of educational credentials, training, and knowledge of legal processes and texts), social (networks), and economic. The dominated actors are clients 242 because they lack the right kinds of capital, particularly cultural capital.
All of the actors within the field tacitly accept "the field's fundamental law . . . which requires that, within the field, conflicts can only be resolved juridically-that is, according to the rules and conventions of the field itself." 243 Actors thus assume without question, and therefore misrecognize, that the law is neutral, apolitical, and objective. 244 They also mistakenly believe that conflicts between people can be converted into clearly defined legal claims 245 that can then be decided by independent and objective thirdparty professional proxies (specifically by the parties' lawyers and the judge) who know and understand the law because of their education and training, 246 and hence can properly and correctly resolve the disputes to achieve justice under the law. 247 Actors also agree to accept "the rules of legislation, regulation, and judicial precedent by which legal decisions are ostensibly structured" 248 as part of the rules of the game. As a result, case outcomes or "solutions are accepted as impartial because they have been defined according to the formal and logically coherent rules of a doctrine perceived as independent of the immediate antagonisms." 249 Because the objectivity, neutrality, and universality of the law and its processes are taken for granted and assumed, all the actors misrecognize that the legal field is actually set up to serve the dominant group's interests. For instance, actors in the dominant group share a closeness of interest resulting from their similar holdings of social (family) and cultural (educational backgrounds) capital. 250 This identity of background and interest fosters similar dispositions 251 and kindred world-views. As a result, "the choices which those in
